

CHRISTIAN HELMUT WENZEL

ETHICS AND ZHUANGZI: AWARENESS,
FREEDOM, AND AUTONOMY

PERSPECTIVAL RELATIVISM

Chad Hansen sees Zhuangzi as some kind of relativist and skeptic. His somewhat linguistic interpretation relies¹ on passages like the following: “Everything has its ‘that’, everything has its ‘this’. From the point of view of ‘that’ you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, ‘that’ comes out of ‘this’ and ‘this’ depends on ‘that’—which is to say that ‘this’ and ‘that’ give birth to each other.”² Hansen reads this as an “argument about indexical demonstratives” which is “near the heart of Zhuangzi’s relativism”. He claims that Zhuangzi “extends this argument about indexicals to claim that all dichotomies of language behave in the same way”³ and that saying ‘this’ or ‘that’ is “right—from some perspective or other”. Similarly, he reads the story of the pipes of men, from the beginning of chapter 2, as an expression of the fact that “all such ways of speaking are equally natural,” that they all are “ways of life,” that they all can be seen as “daos” that are, like words, “inherently social and conventional” and “admissible from some perspective” or other.⁴

Hansen’s interpretation “proposes starting from the hypothesis that Zhuangzi is a skeptical, relativistic reaction to the philosophy of language of the Neo-Mohists.”⁵ This leads him to the claim that “mere adoption of one or another perspective needs no defense,”⁶ that “each system is internally self-justifying,” and that “none is privileged or absolute.”⁷

Such a relativist reading certainly is not unjustified. But I think that this cannot be the whole story. Zhuangzi also has something positive to say, something more than “anything goes” or “go with the flow.” Otherwise, we would ask: What are the pipes and daos of, say, a professional killer? He has his way, too. Philip J. Ivenhoe already made this kind of criticism against Hansen: “Since there are no grounds to anyone’s choice, anything goes and equally well. The ultimate warrant

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that justifies my action would seem to be—as Frank Sinatra tells us—that I did it *my way*.”⁸ Hansen’s relativist reading, Ivanhoe suggests, sees only the Heavenly point of view, a view that is not human but merely a “view from nowhere,”⁹ a view that Zhuangzi does indeed suggest, but to certain people only and merely “as a form of therapy.”¹⁰

Zhuangzi seems to have something positive in mind when he has Lord Wen-hui say: “I have heard the words of Cook Ting and learned how to care for life,”¹¹ or when he has Confucius give the advice: “You must fast,”¹² or when he writes: “The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror.”¹³ Zhuangzi here seems to indicate more than the Heavenly point of view.

TOLERANCE

David Wong maintains the view that insights into the limits of rational justification of morality, together with insights into moral relativity, can provide a basis for tolerance and even compassion. Zhuangzi, Wong argues, provides such insights and thus helps us to develop a sense for equal worth and “to cultivate the part of us that spontaneously identifies with others.”¹⁴ “Acceptance of ethical diversity is part of a larger acceptance of richness and diversity of the world itself.”¹⁵ Zhuangzi certainly recommends this kind of acceptance regarding the world, and he even recommends, so Wong argues, “an enlarged view of what is of value.”¹⁶

The story about Hui Tzu who complains about a huge gourd that he does not know how to make use of (Zhuangzi, ch. 1) reveals Hui Tzu’s narrow-mindedness and recommends a wider view of the range of possibilities. “The morning mushroom knows nothing of twilight and dawn; the summer cicada knows nothing of spring and autumn.”¹⁷ Zhuangzi often ridicules conceited narrow-mindedness: “You can’t discuss the ocean with a well frog.”¹⁸ We should broaden our vision and our mind, not only for the things around us but also, Wong suggests, for other people and their needs. Wong even goes one step further. We should not only see the other’s perspective, but we should sometimes incorporate it into our own: “If one opens up one’s mind to new sources of value, one should sometimes go beyond acceptance of the new towards incorporating it into one’s commitments.”¹⁹

But again, we have to ask: What prevents us from incorporating a professional killer’s perspective into our own commitments? Maybe we should not even tolerate it.

AWARENESS

Both the relativist and the tolerance readings are legitimate. But what they reveal often does not help when we ask ourselves what we should

do, be it in general or in a particular situation. Zhuangzi suggests that we should not be over-ambitious and think of ourselves as so important. Rather, we should stay away from obligations, difficult situations, and places where we do not belong. All this does help, sometimes. But the question remains: What shall we do when we are already involved? Sometimes we cannot stay out of particular situations. Sometimes we have to face a problem and have to make a decision that has major consequences for ourselves as well as for others.

There is something that the relativist and the tolerance readings have in common, namely a tribute to the notion of some kind of awareness in Zhuangzi. There is the awareness of the plurality of possible points of view, and there is the awareness of the specific material the craftsman is dealing with, an awareness the craftsman must have in order to succeed in what he is doing. The craftsman, as Agnus C. Graham put it, “responds with awareness (of what is objectively so).”²⁰ But, if we wish to make use of the notion of awareness regarding morality, we have to ask: What should we be aware of when we have to make a moral decision? Is there something in a moral realm, something that is “objectively so,” something that we can be aware of and respond to? That “awareness” helps to develop one’s ability to take another’s viewpoint and that this in turn might help one to be a morally better person has been suggested by Graham.²¹ But he sees such “viewpoint-shifting to other times or persons” as “not an ethical but a cognitive act.”²² Similarly, Eno writes that “Zhuangzi’s portrait of daos makes no selection among the goals to which it might apply” and that “the text resists any temptation to lay groundwork for a theory that would allow us to transform this valuation of skill mastery into a coherent ethical theory.”²³ Also Yearley concludes that “the moral quality of this perfected state is usually of little interest to Zhuangzi.”²⁴ This perfected state Yearley sees as a spiritual state that is based on “transcendent drive”²⁵ and “daemonic activity”²⁶ and that Zhuangzi wants to point out to us in his stories about craftsmen and their skills.

SKILLS

Cook Ting knows how to cut up an ox without effort and without his knife ever getting blunt. He knows the way to do it. Dance-like and in perfect rhythm he cuts between the joints, goes along with the natural makeup, and forgets about himself (Zhuangzi, ch. 3). There is the cicada catcher who after long practice knows how to be aware of nothing but cicada wings (Zhuangzi, ch. 19). There is the ferryman who handles the boat with great skill. He is as familiar with the water as are others with the ground they walk on in everyday life (Zhuangzi,

ch. 19). The diver knows how to enjoy himself under waterfalls by following the swirls without thinking about himself. He simply grew up with the water and feels perfectly safe in it (Zhuangzi, ch. 19). The woodworker Ch'ing fasts before he goes out to look for the right kind of wood for making bell stands. Only then can he forget about everything else but the wood and the bell stand (Zhuangzi, ch. 19).

Each craftsman has made himself familiar with the material he is dealing with. He has trained his body, and he has developed a specific unity of mind and body, specific to the craft and specific to him and his way of doing it. He does not need to think anymore. He can trust his body, or this unity of mind and body, to do the thinking for him. His body and the object he is dealing with are both material objects. Therefore, he can train his body to develop a specific unity of mind and body, which fits the kind of object he is dealing with. But when it comes to moral problems, what might take the place of the ox in this realm? What takes the place of the cicada wing, the boat, the water, and the wood? And what might be comparable to our body that we use when dealing with these objects? Can we learn anything from the skill stories when it comes to moral problems?

Before continuing the analysis of the skill stories and before trying to see their possible relevance for moral behavior, I will cite the Chinese expressions that I see in the Zhuangzi as corresponding to what Graham calls "responding with awareness (of what is objectively so)." Cook Ting says: "I go along with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are,"²⁷ *yi hu tian li pi da xi dao da kuan yin qi gu ran*^{a, 28} In order to strike (pi), guide (dao), and follow (yin), one has to be aware of the hollows (xi), the openings (kuan), and the things as they are (qi gu ran). Once learned, this seems to work automatically, but when unusually difficult situations arise, one has to consciously watch out, reflect, and learn again: "Whenever I come to a complicated place, I size up the difficulties, tell myself to watch out and be careful, keep my eyes on what I'm doing, work very slowly,"²⁹ *mei zhi yu zu wu jian qi nan wei chu ran wei jie shi wei zhi xing wei chi*^b.

The cicada catcher says to himself: "No matter how huge heaven and earth, or how numerous the ten thousand things, I am aware of nothing but cicada wings,"³⁰ *sui tian di zhi da wan wu zhi duo er wei tiao yi zhi zhi*^c.

Awareness results from acts of abstraction (*sui . . .*) and concentration (*er . . .*). The cicada catcher abstracts from everything but the cicada wings, and he concentrates on nothing but the cicada wings.

The ferryman "sees the water as so much dry land,"³¹ *shi yuan ruo ling*^d, i.e., he is as familiar with the water as are others with dry land;

he does not need to pay extra attention to it. Nevertheless, he sees (shi) it quite well.

The diver says: “I go under with the swirls and come out with the eddies, following along the way the water goes,”³² *yu qi ju ru yu gu jie chu cong shui zhi dao*^e. In order to follow along (cong) the way the water goes (shui zhi dao), he has to be aware of the swirls (qi) and the eddies (gu).

The bell-stand maker “examine[s] the Heavenly nature of the trees,”³³ *guan [shu zhi] tian xing*.^f To do this well, he must first fast to still his mind. Here abstraction and concentration are features of awareness again: “My skill is concentrated and all outside distractions fade away,”³⁴ *qi qiao zhuan er wai hua xiao*^g. Only then can the bell-stand maker ‘respond with awareness (of what is objectively so)’; that is, only then is he able to match up his inner preconceptions with what he encounters, his ideas about bell stands with the material he happens to find: “matching up ‘Heaven’ with ‘Heaven’,”³⁵ *yi tian he tian*.^h

What seems to me worth noting here is that in each case, in each story, there is a certain tacitly presupposed frame of reference, a frame of criteria and values that is not questioned. Cook Ting has to cut oxen, a good cook is one who cuts effortlessly without the knife ever becoming blunt, a good cicada catcher catches a great number of cicadas without losing one, the ferryman never capsizes, the diver does not drown, and the woodworker makes solid and lasting bell stands. The goals and criteria for success are set and tacitly understood. Zhuangzi does not question these goals. He merely shows how to reach them in an artful way. A craftsman is a good craftsman if he has achieved an effortless way of doing what he does. He had to learn how to do this. Over the years his mind and his body became one, and he responds faster than he can ever be consciously aware of. We should observe that all this only works because there is a specified range of objects, which corresponds to the specific craftsmanship, and because there are certain criteria of success that are available right from the start. Cook Ting does not try to be a good swimmer, and the ferryman does not cut oxen. But should we be a cook or a ferryman at all? Why not be a thief? Zhuangzi then might teach us how to be a good one.

Most stories in the Zhuangzi only teach us how to reach a certain goal once the goal is set. They do not show us which goal we should accept and set for ourselves. Even a story like the one telling how Confucius advises Yen Hui how to succeed in advising the ruler of Wei (Zhuangzi, ch. 4) is a success story that does not tell us what it is that Yen Hui should advise the ruler to do. It only tells us how he can get the advice across most successfully, not what the advice itself

is or should be. Similarly, knowledge of the criteria for what makes a good craftsman is taken for granted. They are tacitly presupposed and understood. Zhuangzi tells us how we most artfully fulfill these criteria. But in moral issues the criteria themselves are the problem. Moral problems go deeper.

“Awareness (of what is objectively so)”³⁶ can be cultivated according to the object we are dealing with, be it an ox, a cicada, a boat, water, or wood. In moral issues we are dealing with living beings, objects that have feelings and rights. They are not material objects, and it seems there is no way we can train our body to respond with “awareness (of what is objectively so)” in the realm of morality. We cannot develop some kind of unity of mind and body that would fit best when dealing with others as persons. Persons are not material objects.

But are there no skills beyond the material realm? What about mathematical skills? Can we extend the notion of “awareness (of what is objectively so)” to the mathematical realm? Certainly we can. Without thinking too much, we effortlessly count from 1 to 10—at least once we have learned how to do it. (And Wittgenstein has put his finger on how problematic this is.) But again, mathematical skills depend on a specific domain, the domain of mathematical objects that provides criteria for who is a good mathematician and who is not. The concepts of skill and awareness can be extended to nonmaterial objects like mathematical ones. But can it be extended to human beings as persons? This seems to depend on how clear we are about what makes an object a person. Dealing with another person whom I recognize as my equal seems to be something fundamentally different from dealing with water, wood, or numbers, because in the case of a person I have to be aware of aspects in which he is equal to me. I have to imagine myself in his position. The other has a face. Looking at the other as my equal seems to be somewhat like looking into a mirror.

MIRRORS

In China, mirrors often have been thought of as possessing magical powers. They were supposed to keep ghosts away,³⁷ and they produced fire and water.³⁸ “The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror—going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing. Therefore, he can win out over things and not hurt himself.”³⁹ As water reflects well when it is still, so our heart should be calm and unperturbed. But we should be careful not to overlook certain limits of this metaphor. A mirror does not see anything. A mirror has no

consciousness and does not act. Whenever we want to see something outside of us, we have to let something in, we have to allow something to modify our senses, and we have to interpret what we see. Whatever we see is always already interpreted. A mirror does not do anything of this kind. Hence, it is not obvious at all how to use the mirror metaphor to extend the notion of awareness to the moral realm.

What Zhuangzi suggests often points to some kind of “better life,” that is, as Kupperman pointed out,⁴⁰ not necessarily a morally better life but rather a life where we do not get too much involved in politics and with people. It is a modest life, a life where we react only when necessary and where we had better not act of our own accord at all. But one wonders whether this kind of advice is realistic, whether we can always stay out of what goes on around us, and whether it would always be desirable to do so. How should we behave when we live under a bad political regime? Should we be a killer if fate seems to have allotted this profession to us? Certainly it is helpful to be aware of what is going on around us, to be calm inside and to have a clear vision of our environment or the regime we happen to live under. It helps us to survive. But how should we act under a bad political regime? Should we never revolt against it?

The mirror in Zhuangzi is not used as a metaphor showing us how to think and reflect within ourselves. The mirror in Zhuangzi keeps things away from us, but we do not see ourselves in it.

AWARENESS, FREEDOM, AND AUTONOMY

If we look closer at the craftsmen stories, we see that awareness involves more than we pointed out so far. What a craftsman is aware of is not only the ox, the cicada, the boat, the water, and the wood, as they are by themselves. Rather, what he is aware of is the continuous change of how they relate to him. He cuts the ox, catches the cicada, steers the boat, swims in the water, carves the wood. In each case, there is a process during which he perceives a continuously changing part or feature of the object. The ox presents an always different structure of bones as he cuts it. The cicada and the pole he uses to catch it both move. The wood confronts him with an always different texture while he carves into it. In the water he always faces new currents. What is essential for him is not to see the object as it is by itself. Rather, what is essential to the craftsman is to see the continuous change, the change in what he is dealing with in every moment. This change is partly also caused by him. He has to perceive the changing relationship between himself, his body, his tool, and the object. This

also depends on his intention, namely to cut the ox, to catch the cicada, to get the boat across the river, to swim, or to make a bell stand. He has to make hundreds and thousands of microdecisions, decisions he is not, or hardly any more, aware of; decisions his body makes for him depending on his experience and his intentions. At each moment he is dealing with many possibilities. He has to be somehow aware of them. He has to be aware of new possibilities that might open up once he makes one decision rather than another. He has to be aware of what might be around the corner, what might be next, what the bones, the water, or wood, might be like next. He has to almost continuously choose, and he always has to choose in such a way that what might come next is something he can deal with.

We see that “awareness (of what is objectively so)” involves a complex awareness of possibilities, an awareness of processes, an awareness that takes our abilities into account, an awareness that considers what is possible for us and what is not. This is why it takes so much time to develop such skills and why they become our personal skills (personal, because they involve our own body and mind). When Cook Ting comes to a difficult position, he hesitates and concentrates before going on: “Whenever I come to a complicated place, I size up the difficulties, tell myself to watch out and be careful, keep my eyes on what I’m doing.”⁴¹ Cook Ting keeps learning.

The point I wish to make here is that a skillful craftsman’s awareness also involves awareness of possibilities, awareness of his abilities, and even awareness of himself.

Cutting, steering, swimming, carving, all these are activities and processes that involve interpretation and reflection, reflection not only of what is outside, as does a mirror, but also of our inner states; reflection not without interpretation, as, again, does the mirror, but reflection essentially with interpretation, reflection on, not merely of, states, outer and inner. All this allows us to extend the notion of awareness to the realm of ideas and ideals. But before we turn to this, I wish to discuss the notion of freedom in Zhuangzi.

The emphasis on freedom in Zhuangzi is an emphasis on freedom in the negative sense of the word. We should be free of any desire for wealth and esteem, free of ambition, free of conceit. But is there not also a positive sense of freedom, a freedom to choose, a freedom to set up something new? The notion of free will, however, is a very problematic one. We seem to have an intuitive understanding of it, an intuition that almost forces itself on us once we think about it. But at the same time we find great difficulty in explaining what it is. In Kant we find the notion of freedom predominantly in relation to morality,⁴² as an ability to be autonomous and even he-autonomous, i.e., to give

rules to which we subject ourselves. This, we shall see, is related to awareness.

Certainly Kant and Zhuangzi are very different in character. But nothing can prevent us from learning from both of them, to confront their views with each other and even to combine them. When Kant speaks of morally free actions, he often has the image of a court in mind, a court where we have to accuse, to defend, and to judge, all at the same time and in one person. We have to play all three roles in one person. To do so, we have to reflect within ourselves, we have to imagine ourselves in the position of the other,⁴³ and we should not follow personal interests. There is much rational consideration in Kant, but such consideration seems not to suffice (neither for the philosopher nor for the moral agent). In the end, Kant has to trust some kind of good will in us. He has to count on our willingness to accept the categorical imperative and our willingness to respect it,⁴⁴ and to freely choose to subject ourselves to it. It is for this reason that he thinks so highly of the good will.⁴⁵ At the bottom line, there is in Kant as well as in Zhuangzi some kind of trust in what appears to be good, be it something in us (Kant) or something in the world (Zhuangzi). Both Kant and Zhuangzi often use the same method. They suggest not to act based on personal interests, and they hope that something good remains (in us or in nature). “Let your mind wander in simplicity, blend your spirit with the vastness, follow along with things the way they are, and make no room for personal views—then the world will be governed.”⁴⁶

Zhuangzi's notion of awareness can, I suggest, be extended to the moral realm. Kant wants us to be aware of the idea of man under moral laws, he wants us to embrace this idea, and, in the end, he counts on what appears to be good in us and on our ability to become aware of it. Graham speaks about “awareness (of what is objectively so)” in Zhuangzi. The idea of man under moral laws is not objective as are oxen, water, or wood. It is merely an idea. And we do not respond to this idea with our body. But we do respond to it in our mind, provided we are willing to take this idea into account, to think about it, to imagine man under moral laws, and to respect this idea. And we respond better to this kind of selfless idea if we are still, like water or a mirror, if we are calm, detached, and unperturbed by personal interests like desire for fame and wealth. Indeed, we trust this kind of responsiveness when we ask someone simply to ask himself whether he really thinks what he is doing is right. We ask him to look into himself. We hope that he becomes aware of what we in that situation consider to be right. We trust in this. Awareness and autonomy go well together. To be autonomous even requires some kind of aware-

ness, namely the awareness of possibilities and ideas. But we also need good will and some kind of trust in what appears to be good or to deserve our respect, be this an idea in us or something in nature outside of us.

This sounds circular, but maybe there simply is no purely deductive way of determining what is morally good, and maybe we have to learn how to be aware of what appears to be good and then to act accordingly. Regarding moral issues, it might be more a question of getting into something than a question of deductive reasoning while staying “out of touch” with ideas and the real world.

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ENDNOTES

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1. Chad Hansen, “A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu,” in *Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29*, edited by Victor H. Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 24–55, p. 45.
2. Zhuangzi, chapter 2. *Chuang Tzu, Basic Writings*, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 34f.
3. Hansen, p. 46.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
8. Phillip J. Ivenhoe, “Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?” in *Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi*, edited by Paul Kjellberg and Phillip J. Ivenhoe (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 196–214, p. 198. In this collection I also found the following useful: Mark Berkson, “Language: The Guest of Reality—Zhuangzi and Derrida on Language, Reality, and Skillfulness,” 97–126, and Eric Schwitzgebel, “Zhuangzi’s Attitude Toward Language and His Skepticism,” 68–96.
9. Ivenhoe quoting Nagel. Ivenhoe, p. 200.
10. Ivenhoe, p. 200. One can draw a parallel here with the later Wittgenstein. Both reacted to over-intellectualizations, and both reactions were of a skeptic and therapeutic nature. Wittgenstein saw an over-intellectualization in his own earlier work and in the analytic tradition at the beginning of the 20th century in general. Zhuangzi saw an over-intellectualization in the disputes between Mohists and Confucianists in the 4th century B.C.
11. Zhuangzi, chapter 3, Watson, p. 47.
12. Zhuangzi, chapter 4, Watson, p. 53.
13. Zhuangzi, chapter 7, Watson, p. 95.
14. David Wong, *Moral Relativity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 203.

15. David Wong, "Dwelling in Humanity or Free and Easy Wandering," *Philosophy East and West*, forthcoming.
16. Ibid.
17. Zhuangzi, chapter 1, Watson, p. 24.
18. Zhuangzi, chapter 17, Watson, p. 97.
19. Wong, forthcoming.
20. Agnus C. Graham, "Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of 'Is' and 'Ought'," in Mair, 1983, 3–23, p. 11. There is not a single Chinese character in the Zhuangzi that would, by itself, express this kind of awareness. Rather, a variety of descriptions can be found that do indeed convey this idea of response and awareness.
21. "In submitting to 'Respond with Awareness' I have to admit that awareness from my own viewpoint has no privileged status. This raises the interesting possibility that the concept of awareness might prove to be a bridge over which the equal status of self and other in objective knowledge transfers itself to ethics" (Graham, 16).
22. Graham, p. 16.
23. Robert Eno, "Cook Ding's Dao and the Limits of Philosophy," in Kjellberg, 1996, 127–151, p. 142.
24. Lee Yearley, "The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang-tzu," in Mair, 1983, 125–139, p. 176.
25. Ibid. p. 154.
26. Ibid. p. 176.
27. Zhuangzi, chapter 3, Watson, p. 47.
28. Chen gu ying zhu yi, zhuang zi jin zhu jin yi, tai wan shang wu yin shu guan ⁱ, 1975. Based on the edition of Zhuangzi by Guo Qing Fan ^j.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. chapter 19, Watson, p. 121.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. Watson, p. 126.
33. Ibid. Watson, p. 127.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Graham, p. 11.
37. "Many a traveler, when passing through the mountains, hung mirror amulets from his back in order to protect himself from malicious mountain spirits." Harold H. Oshima, "A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the *Chuang-tzu*," in Mair, 1983, 63–84, p. 75.
38. A concave mirror under the sun can be used to make fire. A bronze mirror at night condenses moisture. See Oshima, 79.
39. Zhuangzi, chapter 7, Watson, p. 95.
40. Joel Kupperman, "Spontaneity and Education of the Emotions in the Zhuangzi," in Kjellberg, 1996, 183–195, p. 186.
41. Zhuangzi, chapter 3, Watson, p. 47.
42. "The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of discovering and making comprehensible an interest which the human being can take in moral laws." Kant, *The Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals*, Akademie Ausgabe (AA) vol. 4, p. 459f; *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy*, translated by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 105.
43. In connection with a discussion of the *sensus communis*, Kant points out three maxims: "(1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and (3) to think always consistently" (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, par. 40, *ibid.* vol. 5, p. 294; tr. Pluhar, Hackett, 1987, p. 160). Addressing himself to the second maxim, Kant writes that it "indicates a man with a broadened way of thinking if he overrides the private subjective conditions of his judgment, into which so many others are locked, as it were, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can determine only by transferring himself to the standpoint of others)" (*ibid.* AA vol. 5, p. 295; tr. Pluhar, p. 161).
44. Respect in general is deeply rooted in us: "Respect is a tribute that we cannot refuse

- to pay to merit, whether we want to or not” (Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book I, Section III, under “On the Incentives [Triebfedern] of Pure Practical Reason”, AA vol. 5, p. 77; *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy*, p. 202).
45. “It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will.” (Kant, *The Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals*, AA vol. 4, p. 393; *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy*, p. 49.)
46. Zhuangzi, ch. 7, Watson, p. 91.

CHINESE GLOSSARY

- a 依乎天理批大郤導人窾因其固然
- b 每至於族吾見其難為怵然為戒視為止行為遲
- c 雖天地之大萬物之多而唯蜩翼之知
- d 視淵若陵
- e 與齊俱入與汨偕出從水之道
- f 觀〔樹之〕天性
- g 其巧專而外滑消
- h 以天合天
- i 陳鼓應註譯，莊子今註今譯，臺灣商務印書館
- j 郭慶藩